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What Went Wrong on the World Wide Web: The
Crossroads of Emerging Internet Technologies and
Attorney Advertising in Louisiana
"If commercial advertisers are First Amendment step-children,
lawyers come closer to abandoned orphans."'
INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1970s, courtrooms have served as a battlefield
for a war waged over self-regulated attorney advertising. 2 On the
front line are attorney advertisers and public interest organizations,
shouting battle cries for unhindered promotion of legal services
and armed with dated, yet durable, First Amendment claims. 3
Defending their posts are state bar associations, bearing little more
than the regulatory tradition of a dignified profession so vital to its
future.4 As with many wars, technological development brings
both opportunities and challenges, which if not properly harnessed
can result in either chaos or unwarranted suppression.5
Copyright 2011, by GRAHAM H. RYAN.

1. Rodney A. Smolla, The Puffery of Lawyers, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 2
(2002).
2. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding a 30day ban on mailed solicitations to accident victims); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n,
486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding that truthful and nondeceptive mail targeted to
individuals with specific needs could not be prohibited); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191 (1982) (holding that states may not impose absolute prohibitions on
potentially misleading information if such information may also be presented in
a way that is not deceptive); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978) (holding that in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain is subject to
regulation); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding that solicitation for
social cause and no pecuniary gain is permissible); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that commercial speech is entitled to First
Amendment protection).
3. See, e.g., Brian Wolfinan, Proposed Rules on Lawyer Advertising in
Louisiana Are Unconstitutional, PUB. CITIZEN (June 6, 2007), http://www.
citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=2452 (arguing that the "[p]roposed
Louisiana rules on lawyer advertising and solicitation are unconstitutional
restrictions on free speech under the First Amendment and would harm many
consumers of legal services").
4. See Went for It, 515 U.S. at 639 (discussing the Court's interest in
"protecting the reputation and dignity of the legal profession"); Bates, 433 U.S.
at 368 (recognizing and "commend[ing] the spirit of public service with which
the profession of law is practiced and to which it is dedicated").
5. See generally MARTIN L. VAN CREVELD, TECHNOLOGY AND WAR:
FROM 2000 B.C. TO THE PRESENT (1991) (considering the influence of

technology over the past 4,000 years on military organization, weaponry,
logistics, intelligence, communications, transportation, and command).
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The technological newcomer in this war is the Internet.
Emerging technologies presented 6by this medium have forever
changed the face of advertising. The distinct nature of these
advertising means evades traditional classification and leaves
many states scrambling to address attorney use. Often times, as
illustrated by Louisiana's failed attempt to regulate attorney
Internet advertising, this haste results in the adoption of shortsighted rules that fail to recognize their own catalyst.7 Louisiana's
recent mishandling of this regulation sheds light upon the necessity
for states to assert a substantial interest in such regulation and to
narrowly tailor regulatory language. 8 As a result, Louisiana's
treatment will likely be viewed as a quintessential misstep in the
realm of attorney Internet advertising regulation as states across
the nation begin to address this emerging issue.9
This Comment argues that overly broad regulations that subject
all attorney Internet advertisements to the exacting - content
requirements governing traditional media, such as the regulations
in Louisiana and Florida, create constitutional and practical
shortcomings.' 0 Rather than categorically regulating attorney
Internet advertising, states should draft rules considerate of both
consumer and commercial speech protection, which specifically
address the functionality underlying the most prevalent forms of
Internet advertising, such as pay-per-click advertising."
As state bar associations jostle to regulate a forthcoming
generation of technically erudite attorneys, the need to address
attorney advertising on the Internet in a clear and sufficient manner
has never been more urgent. The onset of Internet technologies
presents a single, yet crucial, battle in the larger scope of
6. See DAVID W. SCHUMANN & ESTHER THORSON, INTERNET
ADVERTISING: THEORY AND RESEARCH 3 (2007) ("We know now that the way
people consume, interact, share, view, and communicate with information,
entertainment, and each other has changed forever." (quoting Christopher M.
Schroeder, The Media World Will Never, Ever, Be the Same, MEDIAPOST (Sept.
22, 2005, 6:00 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/index.cfm?fa=
Articles.showArticle&art aid=34325) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7. See discussion infra Part III.B.l.c.
8. Email from Scott G. Wolfe, Jr. to the Bureau of Nat'l Affairs (2009),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/la-ad.pdf ("[This] decision [in Pub.
Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd, 642 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D. La.
2009)] underlines that the state has a burden to justify regulations, and narrowly
tailor them . . . and in the case of the Internet, they must specifically consider
that medium in formulating a justification and in properly tailoring the rule.").
9. Id (characterizing the ruling in Public Citizen as "quite consequential
for attorneys in other states who want to challenge their state's restriction on
Internet advertising").
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part V.
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competing perspectives-one that is likely determinative of a
regulatory stronghold for decades to come. Part I of this Comment
provides a brief history of attorney advertising regulation spanning
back to the late 1970s. Part II explores emerging advertising
technologies on the Internet, focusing on their functionality and
inherent distinction from traditional advertising media. Part III
examines current regulatory schemes as they apply to these
prevailing technologies, and Part IV sheds light on their
constitutional and practical shortcomings. Finally, Part V draws
inferences from the shortcomings in these rules and proposes
necessary action.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISING REGULATION

The United States Supreme Court first recognized the
protection of commercial speech under the First Amendment in
197612 and in doing so sparked a flurry of activity relating to its
application to attorney advertising. The Court specifically applied
First Amendment protection to attorney advertising a year later in
Bates v. State Bar ofArizona, in which the Court ruled that states
could regulate false, deceptive, or misleading lawyer
advertisements, but that these advertisements "may not be subject
to blanket suppression," as this would inhibit the free flow of
information.' 4 In Bates, the Supreme Court of Arizona imposed
disciplinary sanctions on two attorneys who violated a rule
prohibiting attorney advertising.' The Arizona State Bar justified
this rule by purporting that legal advertisements adversely affect
professionalism, are inherently misleading, increase litigation and
the cost of legal services encourage shoddy work, and are difficult
to monitor for abuse. 6 The United States Supreme Court
concluded that truthful advertisements, such as those put forth by
the appellants, are worthy of First Amendment protection,' 7 but

12. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
13. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Bates Court was concerned that lawyer
advertising might not provide consumers with all relevant information needed to
make an informed decision about counsel but noted that the prohibition of
advertising "serves only to restrict the information that flows to consumers." Id.
at 374.
14. Id.at383.
15. Id. at 359.
16. Id. at 368-79.
17. Id. at 386.
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clearly held that false, deceptive, or misleading advertisements are
within the scope of state regulation.' 8
Although the United States Supreme Court was hesitant to
apply a categorical ban on lawyer communications, it did so in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n 19 with respect to in-person
solicitation.2 0 The Court in Ohralik, decided one year after Bates,
distinguished in-person solicitation from speech traditionally
protected by the First Amendment, stating that in-person
solicitation "does not stand on par" with truthful advertising.
Two years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission,2 2 the Court developed a test to
determine whether states may regulate commercial speech.2 3 First,
the government must assert a substantial interest in support of its
regulation; second, the government must demonstrate that the
restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances
that interest; and third, the regulation must be narrowly drawn.2 4
Both the United States Supreme Court and lower courts have
subsequently used this test to assess whether commercial s eech is
protected specifically in the context of attorney advertising.
The United States Supreme Court addressed attorney
advertising most recently in the 1995 case FloridaBar v. Went for
It, Inc.,26 in which state regulation of attorney advertising was
18. Id. at 383.
19. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
20. Solicitation differs from advertising in that it refers to a lawyer's direct
communication with a prospective client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2010). In Louisiana, solicitation is governed by Louisiana
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.4, "Direct Contact with Prospective
Clients," which prohibits lawyers from
solicit[ing] professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior lawyer-client relationship, in
person, by person to person verbal telephone contact, through others
acting at the lawyer's request or on the lawyer's behalf or otherwise,
when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain.
LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2010).
21. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455. "The solicitation of business by a lawyer
through direct, in-person communication with the prospective client has long
been viewed as inconsistent with the profession's ideal of the attorney-client
relationship and as posing a significant potential for harm to the prospective
client." Id. at 454.
22. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
23. Id. at 566.
24. Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc. 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (citing Cent.
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65).
25. See, e.g., Went for It, 515 U.S. at 623; Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney
Disciplinary Bd., 642 F. Supp. 2d 539, 552-53 (E.D. La. 2009).
26. 515 U.S. 618.
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upheld.2 7 There, the Court found that a Florida rule requiring a 30day waiting period for targeted, direct-mail solicitation of personal
injury and wrongful death clients met the test set forth in Central
Hudson.28 The Court reiterated that if commercial speech is either
inherently misleading or has been proven to be misleading, the
state may "freely regulate" it.2 9 Today, the landmark Bates
decision and the Central Hudson test remain highly applicable in
the realm of attorney advertising regulation as it relates to
commercial speech.
II. TRADITIONAL AND EMERGING FORMS OF ADVERTISING

Since the United States Supreme Court's application of
commercial speech protection to attorney advertising in the late
1970s, lawyers have utilized virtually every thinkable advertising
medium to provide information about their legal services and to
attract clients. For over three decades, an array of advertising
options has allowed attorneys to construct advertisements within
the confines of regulations enacted by state bar associations.
Though abundant, many of these traditional advertising options
have remained considerably unchanged, allowing states to keep
pace with lawyer use through rule enactment. The onset of the
Internet, however, presents advertising options distinct from those
in traditional media.
A. TraditionalForms ofAdvertising
Television, billboards, bus stops, direct mail, and phonebooks
all contain attorney advertisements that many potential clients view
on a daily basis. Many of these advertisements exhibit qualities
that state bar associations have deemed sufficiently similar to
justify their regulation by general rules. A common characteristic
of many of these traditional advertisements is their "linear flow"the content of billboards is seldom updated daily, and the message
conveyed in direct mail remains unmodified once printed resulting
in little interaction between advertiser and consumer.36 Another
27. Id. at 644-45.
2 8. Id.
29. Id. at 623-24 (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64); see also In
re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982) (noting that a state is entitled to prohibit
advertising if it can show that it is "inherently likely to deceive" or has produced
a "record indicat[ing] that a particular form or method of advertising has in fact
been deceptive").
30. Alexa Bezjian-Avery et al., New Media Interactive Advertising vs.
TraditionalMedia, J. ADVERTISING RES., July/Aug. 1998, at 23, 24, availableat
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shared characteristic of these advertisements is their "passive
exposure" to consumers. 3 1 They are seldom directed to a particular
individual, and they generally appear without any act of volition by
the viewer. Over the course of three decades, the qualities of these
media have remained relatively unchanged, allowing state bar
associations to carefully draft rules governing their content, which
provide lawyers with sufficient guidance when advertising through
such media.
Advancements in advertising technology, however, have
presented media that evade traditional classification. Although some
commentators argue that Internet advertising is sufficiently similar
to traditional advertising to warrant comparable regulation, 2 others
claim that the global reach of the Internet calls for a different
approach. 33
B. EmergingForms ofAdvertising: The Internet
In Reno v. ACL U, 3 4 the United States Supreme Court
considered the protection of speech on the Internet, drawing a
distinction between Internet speech and traditional broadcast
media. Describing the Internet as a "unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide communication," 35 the Court noted that the
"vast democratic forums of the Internet [have not been] subject to
the type of government supervision and regulation that has
attended the broadcast industry." 36 The Court also described the
Internet as "not as 'invasive' as radio or television" because
"communications over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's
home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden."37

http://marketing.wharton.upenn.edulideas/pdf/Iacobucci/Internet/jarl998-alexa.
pdf.
31. Id.
32. See generally Jordan Rappaport, Comment, Attorney Advertising on the
Internet, U. MIAMI SCH. L. (1996), http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/
seminar/papers/rappaport.htm.
33. See Christopher Hurld, Untangling the Wicked Web: The Marketing of
Legal Services on the Internet and the Model Rules, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
827, 837 (2004).
34. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
35. Id. at 850 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa.
1996)).
36. Id. at 868-69.
37. Id. at 869 (quoting Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844). But see Pub. Citizen, Inc.
v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 642 F. Supp. 2d 539, 558-59 (E.D. La. 2009)
(discussing how some Internet advertisements, such as pop-up advertisements,
do not fall within the Reno Court's description of the Internet as not invasive).
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The Internet presents diverse and previously unthinkable
means by which advertisers can convey their message to
consumers.3 8 These means serve to, among other things, level the
playing field for lawyers who use it as an advertising medium,
because decreased marketing costs allow sole practitioners and
smaller firms to advertise directly beside larger competitors.3 9 The
benefits of decreased cost, immediate publication, and
customization available on the Internet allow lawyers to reach
beyond the confines of traditional media and advertise in unique
ways.4 0 The Internet, although seemingly a single advertising
alternative, actually serves as a realm consisting of several
different media, many of which contain unique and distinctive
components. 4 1 As such, Internet advertising differs significantly
from advertising in traditional media.4 2
1. The Pay-Per-ClickAdvertising Model as Illustratedby
Google AdWords
The most pervasive form of Internet advertising is the "payper-click" (PPC) advertising model.4 3 Under this model, an
advertiser places a small advertisement on a search engine or other
See also SCHUMANN & THORSON, supra note 6, at 17-18 (comparing
"intrusiveness" of traditional advertising to Internet advertising).
38. The discussion herein will focus on the function of Internet
advertisements to entice Internet users to "click through" the advertisement to
the advertiser's website, thereby redirecting the user to such website.
39. See CHRISTOPHER B. SCHULTZ, ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF LOUISIANA
LAWYER ADVERTISING RULES ON PAY PER CLICK & INTERNET MARKETING 2
(2009), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/fileServer.aspx?fName=
06518883-3c34-4dal-al98-867c9ba091Of doc ("Marketing budgets can start small
(as little as $10/month) and grow as a business grows.

. .

. A small business

advertisement can appear right next to a[n] established, larger competitor.").
40. See Daniel Becker, Choice of Law in Online Legal Ethics: Changing a
Vague Standardfor Attorney Advertising on the Internet, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
2409, 2409 (2002); Kristine M. Moriarty, Law Practiceand the Internet: The
Ethical Implications That Arise from MultifurisdictionalOnline Legal Service,
39 IDAHO L. REV. 431, 431 (2003); Margaret Hensler Nicholls, A Quagmire of
Internet Ethics Law and the ABA Guidelines for Legal Website Providers, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1021, 1022 (2005).

41.
42.

See SCHUMANN & THORSON, supra note 6, at 15-17.
Pub. Citizen, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 559.

43. See BORIS MORDKOVICH & EUGENE MORDKOVICH, PAY-PER-CLICK
SEARCH ENGINE MARKETING HANDBOOK: Low COST STRATEGIES FOR
ATTRACTING NEW CUSTOMERS USING GOOGLE, MSN, YAHOO! & OTHER

SEARCH ENGINES 3 (2005) ("The growth of the online advertising industry
makes pay-per-click advertising the most popular and lucrative means of online
advertising today.").
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website and pays the amount agreed upon or bid for only when an
Internet user clicks the advertisement and is redirected to the
"landing" page." PPC advertisements provide a large source of
revenue to many search engines such as Yahoo, MSN, Bing, and
Google. 45 Because nearly 99% of all Internet users utilize search
engines, regulatory focus should be given to the advertising
methods employed thereon.
An understanding of the PPC advertising model is best
obtained through analysis of what was once referred to as possibV
"the most successful business idea in history": Google AdWords.
This revolutionary advertising model analyzes every Google
search to determine which advertisements will be listed as a
"sponsored link" on a result page. 48 Essentially, Google combines
an advertiser's bid for an advertisement and a metric termed
"quality score" to ensure that the advertisements appearing on a
results pa e are "true, high-caliber matches for what users are
querying.' This metric incorporates factors such as the relevancy
of an advertisement to the search term, the quality of the landing
page that the advertisement is linked to, and the percentage of
times an advertisement is actually clicked. 0 Google also imposes
penalties for low quality advertisements to protect users from
exposure to irrelevant or annoying advertisements. 5 Simply put,
attorneys can create an advertisement and select which search
terms will trigger its viewing, and Google takes regulatory
measures to ensure that each potential client views advertisements
relevant to his search. As illustrated by AdWords, PPC advertising
provides high-quality, relevant advertisements, the likes of which
are incomparable to any other existing form of advertising.
The components of an AdWords advertisement
include a title,
52
two sets of advertising text, a display URL, and a landing URL,
44. Id. at 6.
45. Ninety-seven percent of Google's general revenue is drawn from
advertising revenue, which amounted to over $21 billion in 2008. See 2010
Financial Tables, GOOGLE INVESTOR REL., http://investor.google.com/findata.
html (last visited Dec. 19, 2010).
46. iProspectSearch Engine UserAttitudes, IPROSPECT, at 6 (2004), http://
www.iprospect.com/premiumPDFs/iProspectSurveyComplete.pdf ("It should be
of very little surprise that 98.8% of Internet users report using search engines.").
47. Steven Levy, The Secrets of Googlenomics, WIRED, June 2009, at 110.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 114.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. A URL is a "Uniform Resource Locator," commonly referred to as an
Internet address or web address. Gregerson v. Vilana Fin., Inc., No. 06-1164,
2007 WL 2509718, at *6 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2007).
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all of which are subject to strict limitations of 25 or 30

characters. 53
In order to submit a PPC advertisement to Google, an
advertiser must complete several steps. First, he must choose
certain keywords that will trigger the advertisement's appearance
when those keywords are utilized in a search term.54 Next, the
advertiser writes an "ad copy," which is a character-limited area
for the marketing message. Several variations of advertisements
are often submitted with a corresponding ad copy, each designed to
be triggered by different keywords.5 6 Then, the advertiser enters
the display and landing URLs. Finally, he sets an advertising
budget starting at, for instance, 10 cents per click and a budget of
25 dollars per month.
After an advertiser submits a PPC advertisement, he can
perform optimization measures by adjusting the ad copies,
keywords, and budget to ensure that each advertisement is
displayed appropriately and that he receives sufficient value from
an advertisement.ss This optimization requires frequent changing
of the advertisement content to maximize its effectiveness.
Although the Internet serves as little more than a revolving
door for many advertising technologies, Google is accessed daily
by more than 60% of Internet users.59 Google's freely accessible
browsers, applications, and email services ensure that it will
remain a market participant for the measurable future.60 In fact, the
large number of advertisements sold by Google further solidifies
its dominant market share because each advertisement sold
"generates torrents of data about users' tastes and habits . . . in
order to predict future consumer behavior, find ways to improve its
products, and sell more ads."61
The progression of Google's advertising techniques affirms the
notion that these technologies will continue to advance. Since the
company's first advertisement sale in 2000, which took the form of
a simple block of text relevant to the search query, 62 to a decade
53. SCHULTZ, supra note 39, at 2.
54. Id at 2.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id.
57. Id
58. Id.
59. Levy, supra note 47, at 110.
60. Id Hal Varian, UC Berkeley Haas School of Business and School of
Information professor and Google's chief economist, justifies Google's array of
free services by arguing that anything that increases Internet use ultimately
enriches Google.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 110-14.
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later, where a human salesman has been replaced by algorithmic
technology, Google AdWords has become "the world's biggest,
fastest auction, a never-ending, automated, self-service version of
Tokyo's boisterous Tsukiji fish market." 63
2. Social Networking
In addition to Google AdWords, many other Internet
advertisements entice users to "click through" them, thereby
redirecting the user to a website.64 Among these is another Internet
advertising option available to lawyers called social networking.
Social networks are Internet platforms that enable users to create
profiles and connect with other individuals through shared hobbies,
business affiliations, and other interests. 65 Social networking is not
only a growing trend for connectivity with family and friends but
has also become a valuable tool for many in the legal profession. 66
The trend in lawyer social networking is growing at an enormous
rate, as 43% of lawyers were members of a social network in 2009,
up from 15% in 2008.67
Some of the most popular social networks include Facebook,68
MySpace,6 9 Twitter, 70 Linkedln," and Avvo.7 2 These networks all
63. Id. at I10.
64. See Nicholas Kushmerick, Learning to Remove InternetAdvertisements,
PROC. 3D ANN. CONF. ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS 175, 175 (1999) ("Ifjudged to
be interesting or relevant, users can click on these so-called 'banner
advertisements,' jumping to the advertiser's own site.").
65. Social networking allows members to "use their online profiles to
become part of an online community of people with common interests." Doe v.
MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
66. On July 30, 2009, the ABA featured a session on "Social Networks,
Blawgs, and Podcasts: Business Development Tools for the Internet Age" to teach
lawyers what social networks are, why they should become skilled in them, and
how to effectively use them. See Ethical Implications of Web 2.0 Technology,
Green Marketing, Rainmaking in a Recession Among Law Practice Topics to be
Explored at ABA Annual Meeting in Chicago, A.B.A. (July 20, 2009),
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/release/newsrelease.cfm?releaseid=715; see
also Leora Maccabee, Legal Marketing Ethics in a Web 2.0 World, LAWYERIST
(July 17, 2009), http://lawyerist.com/legal-marketing-ethics-web-2-0.
67. See Reginald Davis, Getting Personal:Social Networks Appeal, but Not
to the Firm, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2009, at 30, available at http://www.abajournal.
com/magazine/getting personal/.
68. Facebook enables its users to present themselves in an online profile,
accumulate "friends" who can post comments on each others' pages, and view
each others' profiles. Facebook members can also join virtual groups based on
common interests; see what classes they have in common; and learn each others'
hobbies, interests, musical tastes, and romantic relationship status through the
profiles. Nicole B. Ellison, The Benefits of Facebook "Friends": Social Capital
and College Students' Use of Online Social Network Sites, J. COMPUTER-
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involve dozens of means by which lawyers can interact and
advertise, including direct messaging, broadcast messaging to both
specified groups and all network users, bulletin board postings,
commentary, and interactive applications developed by third
parties such as games.73
In addition to these advertising methods, PPC advertising plays
a large role in social networking, as it generally serves as the main
source of revenue for these networks. 4 Social networking sites
allow lawyers to quickly and easily create image and text-based
advertisements that redirect users to a law firm website or a page
Many of these
contained within that social network.
advertisements utilize PPC advertising technology similar to that
used by Google AdWords and provide optimization measures to
track who is clicking an advertisement and to maximize its

(July 2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue4/ellison.
html; see FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2010).
69. Myspace is a social network that allows users to connect through online
profiles and express themselves through pictures, videos, music, and web
postings. See MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2010).
70. Twitter is a free social networking and micro-blogging service that
enables its users to send and read messages known as "tweets." Tweets are textbased posts of up to 140 characters displayed on the author's profile page and
delivered to the author's subscribers, who are known as "followers." Senders
can restrict delivery to those in their circle of friends or, by default, allow open
access. Users can send and receive tweets via the Twitter website, Short
Message Service (SMS), or external applications. See TWITTER, http://twitter.
com (last visited Dec. 19, 2010). See generally Akshay Java et al., Why We
Twitter: Understanding Microblogging Usage and Communities, PROC. JOINT
9TH WEBKDD & 1sT SNA-KDD WORKSHOP (2007), available at http://
ebiquity.umbc.edu/_filedirectory_/papers/369.pdf.
71. Linkedln is a business-oriented social networking site mainly used for
professional networking. The purpose of the site is to allow registered users to
maintain a list of contact details of people they know and trust in business. The
people in the list are called "connections." Users can invite anyone (whether a
site user or not) to become a connection. See LINKEDIN, http://www.
linkedin.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2010).
72. Avvo is a free website that helps consumers handle their legal matters
through lawyer rating and profiles, client reviews, lawyer disciplinary histories,
and peer endorsements. See Avvo, http://www.avvo.com (last visited Dec. 19,
2010).
73. See supra notes 68-72.
74. See Eric Eldon, Is the Big FacebookAdvertising Experiment Working?,
VENTuRE BEAT (Mar. 31, 2009), http://venturebeat.com/2009/03/31/is-the-bigfacebook-advertising-experiment-working/ (discussing Facebook and Myspace
profiting from advertising).
75. For a detailed description of Facebook's social network advertising, see
Guide to Facebook Ads, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/adsmarketing
(last visited Dec. 19, 2010).
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effectiveness. 76 As with AdWords, these advertisements contain
limitations on character and text space. 77 The ease of use and
inexpensive nature of both connecting through social networks and
advertising thereon, coupled with the ability to target specific
consumer groups, provides lawyers the ability to efficiently market
their services to, in the case of Facebook, over 500,000,000 active
users.7 8
3. Lawyer andLaw Firm Websites
PPC advertising and social networking allow lawyers to market
their services in an arguably more efficient and effective manner
than any other media. The links contained in those advertisements
often redirect users to a law firm website, which generally provides
a more comprehensive source of information regarding legal
services. PPC advertisements, then, serve merely to entice
visitation of a law firm website where the bulk of information
about legal services is actually contained. Additionally, while
Internet advertisements entice users to visit law firm websites
indirectly by clicking the advertisements, users also encounter
these websites voluntarily by either searching for a specific lawyer
or law firm or by entering a law firm's web address. Thus, Internet
users encounter law firm websites both voluntarily and indirectly
by clicking advertisements.
Although not as novel as PPC advertising, websites still exhibit
characteristics distinguishable from traditional advertisements.
Absent the transitory nature of traditional advertisements conveyed
via television, radio, and billboards, websites can offer more
voluminous and detailed information than virtually any other
medium. 7 9 Websites therefore allow for more deliberation during
information intake than do traditional media or PPC
advertisements. 8 0 Additionally, volition is present in the website
context more so than with traditional media, as consumers often
voluntarily enter a web address or conduct a specific search before

76. Id.
77. Id. A Facebook advertisement title can have up to 25 characters, and the
advertising body can have up to 135 characters.
7 8. Id.
79. See generally Maria Sicilia et al., Effects of Interactivity in a Website:
The Moderating Effect of Need for Cognition, J. ADVERTISING, Fall 2005, at 31
(discussing interactivity of websites as allowing for greater information intake
and personal control over information exchange).
80. Id. at 31-32.
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viewing a website.8 1 Conversely, advertisements82 in traditional
media often appear without action by the consumer.
An exploration of emerging forms of advertising available on
the Internet illustrates their inherent distinction from traditional
advertising and complex functionality. Although some of these
media have been around for decades, many are far more recent
developments that will continue to evolve at the pace of
technology. Accordingly, the distinct complexity and evolutionary
nature of these advertising technologies underlies the
impracticality of categorical subjection of all Internet
advertisements to traditional advertising rules.83
III. REGULATION OF EMERGING ADVERTISING TECHNOLOGIES

Exploring the intricacies of emerging Internet advertising
technologies raises the issue of how regulatory schemes treat their
use by lawyers. Analysis of the undertakings of the American Bar
Association (ABA) and state bar associations reveals that
categorical application of the rules governing traditional forms of
advertising to all Internet advertisements through broad, allencompassing regulatory language results in discord.
A. Sparse Guidancefrom the ABA
The ABA has been a source of guidance for ethical standards
in the legal profession for over a century, dating back to the 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics. 84 The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (the "Model Rules"), 85 adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates in 1983, replaced the preceding Model Code of
Professional Responsibility 6 and currently serve as a model for the
ethical rules governing attorneys in most states.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See discussion infra Part IV.
84. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908), available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/Canons Ethics.pdf.
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2010).
86. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1980), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.pdf.
87. As of November 3, 2010, 45 states and the District of Columbia had
adopted the revised rules. Of the remaining five states, Texas and West Virginia
had circulated proposed rules. Georgia and Hawaii had not yet issued a report.
California employs its own rules. Status of State Review ofProfessionalConduct
Rules, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/cpr/pic/ethics_2000_status-chart.pdf (last
updated Nov. 3, 2010) (illustrating the status of state review of the Model
Rules).
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1. Ethics 2000
The past few decades were marked by rapid expansion of
Internet technologies, and initial attempts by the ABA to account
for this change were unsuccessful.8 8 The Model Rules largely fail
to address Internet advertising sufficiently for uniform state
adoption.89 The ABA recognized this void in Internet advertising
guidance and created the Ethics 2000 Commission in 1997 to
review the Model Rules. 90 Although Ethics 2000 "made some
Internet related changes to [Model] Rules 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3, these
changes were limited." 9 '
The changes to Rule 7.1, which prohibits false or misleading
communications about legal services, expanded the rule's
commentary to describe how truthful statements can be misleading
if they omit facts necessary to make the law firm's communication
considered as a whole not materially misleading. 92 The language of
the rule states that it should be aplied to "all communications,"
apparently covering the Internet, but the change included no
Internet or computer-based communication references. The
changes to Rule 7.2 amended permissible advertising avenues to
include "electronic communication."94 Comment 3 of this rule was
amended to state that "electronic media, such as the Internet, can
be an important source of information about legal services." 9 5 Rule
7.3 was amended to restrict solicitation by "real-time electronic
contact" or "electronic communication" unless warranted by
certain circumstances. 96 Through Ethics 2000, the ABA attempted
to address advertising rules in light of emerging technologies, but
as commentators point out, identifying the technological
88. Hurld, supra note 33, at 827 ("The [Model Rules] have not kept pace
with issues created by the Internet explosion and Internet-based lawyer
advertising.").
89. Id.
90. Charlotte Stretch, Overview of Ethics 2000 Commission and Report,
A.B.A., at 1, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-ovmar02.doc (last visited Dec.
27, 2010).
91. Hurld, supranote 33, at 827.
92. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2010).
93. See id. cmt. 1, which states that the rule "governs all communications
about a lawyer's services, including advertising permitted by [Model] Rule 7.2.
Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about
them must be truthful."
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2.
95. Id. cmt. 3.
96. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3. The commentary to this
rule also contained minor amendments to incorporate the "real-time electronic
contact" language. Id. cmts. 1-3.
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shortcomings of the advertising rules and adequately correcting
them are distinct tasks. 97
2. Ethics 20/20
The ABA's most recent acknowledgement of the technological
impact on lawyer discipline was marked by its formation of the
ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 in 2009.98 Ethics 20/20 will
supplement the work of existing committees on client protection,
ethics and professional responsibility, and professional discipline,
thereby illustrating the ABA's intent to move forward in
embracing these technologies and adapting current guidelines to
account for their use by attorneys. 99 Ethics 20/20 is charged with a
thorough review of the Model Rules in the context of advances in
technology and global legal practice developments.!00 However,
initial news releases by the ABA on Ethics 20/20 fail to mention
any proposed action to specifically address attorney Internet
advertising,101 and pertinent modification to the Model Rules
seems unlikely in the near future. As such, the ethical implications
of lawyers' use of modern technology, though acknowledged by
the ABA, are still admittedly absent from ABA ethics codes and
regulatory structure.102 Consequently, as the ABA has been slow to
provide a workable model of Internet advertising regulation for
state adoption, states are forced to deal internally with emerging
advertising technologies.

97. See Matthew Garner Mercer, Lawyer Advertising on the Internet: Why
the ABA's Proposed Revisions to the Advertising Rules Replace the Flat Tire
with a Square Wheel, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 713, 727-28 (2001).
98. See ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics Commission to
Address Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing US. Lawyers,
A.B.A. (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/release/news_
release.cfm?releaseid=730 [hereinafter Ethics Commission].
99. Id.; see also Message from Commission on Ethics 20/20 Co-Chairs
Jamie S. Gorelick and Michael Traynor, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/ethics
2020/chairs.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2010).
100. See Ethics Commission, supra note 98.
101. Id.
102. Id. At the American Bar Association's announcement of the ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20, President Carolyn Lamm stated:
Technological advances and globalization have changed our profession
in ways not yet reflected in our ethics codes and regulatory structure.
Technologies such as e-mail, the Internet and smart phones are
transforming the way we practice law and our relationships with
clients, just as they have compressed our world and expanded
international business opportunities for our clients.
Id.
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B. State Regulation
The ABA Model Rules and recent initiatives fall short of
providing a model for states to incorporate rules pertinent to
Internet advertising, and, as a result, states have been forced to
develop their own Internet advertising rules. Since the turn of the
century, states have scrambled to keep their advertising regulations
on pace with Internet advances.' 0 3 Often times this urge to control
the conduct of attorneys on the Internet has led to the adoption of
short-sighted rules that fail to recognize their catalyst-the
evolution of Internet technologies. Indeed, states have often
subjected these advertisements to rules developed in different
times, for different media.
Although inadequate Model Rule guidance unquestionably
presents problems of disunity,104 an arguably beneficial byproduct
is state innovation in the area of advertising regulation-a matter
particularly advantageous in the evolutionary realm of the Internet.
Thus, states should continue to lead the charge in developing rules
to account for attorney advertising on the Internet, but in doing so
should acknowledge the distinct functionality of Internet
advertisements.
An analysis of two very similar rules governing Internet
advertising in Louisiana and Florida illustrates how states have
overlooked the distinct nature of Internet advertisements and
disregarded the interplay between these advertisements and law
firm websites. Rule 7.6 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional
Conduct'05 (the "Louisiana Rules") and Rule 4-7.6 of the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar' 06 (the "Florida Rules") were crafted
specifically for computer-accessed communications, and both
generated lively debate within their respective legal communities. o0

103. See Nia Marie Monroe, The Need for Unformity: Fifty Separate Voices
Lead to Disunion in Attorney Internet Advertising, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1005, 1010 (2005).
104. Id. at 1015.
105. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.6 (2010).
106. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BARR. 4-7.6 (2010).
107. See PETITION TO AMEND THE RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BARRULE 4-7.6, COMPUTER ACCESSED COMMUNICATIONS, APPENDIX E (2008),
available at http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsfAttachments/207
IFA6597020408852574DC005246EC/$FILE/Appendix%20E%20-%20Selected
%20Materials%2ORegarding%2OVarious%20Proposed%20Amendments.pdf?O
penElement (containing selected articles, commentary, and email submissions
regarding proposed changes to the Florida Rules).
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1. Louisiana'sApproach to Internet Advertising Regulation:
Rule 7.6 "Computer-Accessed Communications"
a. The Source ofLouisianaRule 7.6
In 2006, following changes made to the Florida Rules
regarding lawyer advertising, the Louisiana Legislature adopted a
concurrent resolution stating that "the manner in which some
members of the Louisiana State Bar Association (LSBA) are
advertising their services in this state has become undignified and
poses a threat to the way attorneys are perceived."' 0 8 In response,
the Louisiana Supreme Court formed the Committee to Study
Lawyer Advertising (the "Supreme Court Committee"), 109 which
reviewed a copy of a Florida survey that illustrated public
perception of attorney advertising.11o The LSBA Rules of
Professional Conduct Committee (the "LSBA Committee") also
met several times"' to assemble proposed amendments to Part 7 of
the Louisiana Rules.112 Upon completion of the LSBA
Committee's proposal, the Supreme Court Committee met and
voted to endorse the LSBA Committee's proposed amendments.' 3
The Louisiana House of Delegates then voted to accept the LSBA
108. S. Con. Res. 113, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006), available at http:/
www.1sba.org/2007InsideLSBA/documents/ethics/2006LegisConcurrentResolut
ion.pdf. The resolution noted consideration of Senate Bill No. 617, which would
have established a committee "to address ethical concerns posed by lawyer
advertising and to present a more positive message to the citizens of this state."
Id.
109. The committee was chaired by Justice Catherine D. Kimball and
consisted of Rick Stanley, Chair of the LSBA's Rules of Professional Conduct
Committee; Senator Rob Marionneaux, the sponsor of the joint resolution; and
several attorneys.
110. See Minutes of the Comm. to Study Lawyer Adver., Sept. 15, 2006, at
3, available at http://does.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/louisiana/
laedce/2:2008cv04451/128148/42/40.html.
111. The LSBA Committee met four times between September 21, 2006 and
October 6, 2006.
112. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 642 F. Supp. 2d 539
(E.D. La. 2009).
113. See Minutes of the Comm. to Study Lawyer Adver., Oct. 23, 2006,
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/louisiana/laedce/2:
2008cv04451/128148/42/41.html. In order to gauge public opinion on the
proposal, the LSBA Committee held several public hearings on the proposed
amendments in November 2006. History ofLSBA Proposalfor the New Rules, LA.
ST. BAR Ass'N, http://www.1sba.org/2007MemberServices/LawyerAdHistory.asp
(last visited Dec. 20, 2010) (hearing transcripts for Nov. 2 (Baton Rouge, LA),
Nov. 8 (Lafayette, LA), Nov. 9 (New Orleans, LA), and Nov. 16 (Shreveport,
LA)).
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Committee's proposalll 4 and recommended that the Louisiana
Supreme Court incorporate the proposed rules." 5 The Louisiana
Supreme Court adopted the rules on July 3, 2008, to become
effective December 1, 2008.116
The proposed rules contained Louisiana Rule 7.6, entitled
"Computer-Accessed Communications," is nearly identical to
Florida Rule 4-7.6, likewise titled "Computer-Accessed
Communications."
b. The Context and Scope ofLouisiana Rule 7.6
Louisiana Rule 7.617 is located in the section of the Louisiana
Rules entitled "Information About Legal Services." 1 18 The rule
114. The Louisiana House of Delegates voted to accept the proposed
amendments on June 7, 2007.
115. Pub. Citizen, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
116. Id.
117. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.6 (2010) ("Computer Accessed
Communications"):
(a) Definition. For purposes of these Rules, "computer-accessed
communications" are defined as information regarding a lawyer's or
law firm's services that is read, viewed, or heard directly through the
use of a computer. Computer-accessed communications include, but are
not limited to, Internet presences such as home pages or World Wide
Web sites, unsolicited electronic mail communications, and information
concerning a lawyer's or law firm's services that appears on World
Wide Web search engine screens and elsewhere.
(b) Internet Presence. All World Wide Web sites and home pages
accessed via the Internet that are controlled, sponsored, or authorized
by a lawyer or law firm and that contain information concerning the
lawyer's or law firm's services:
(1) shall disclose all jurisdictions in which the lawyer or members of
the law firm are licensed to practice law;
(2) shall disclose one or more bona fide office location(s) of the
lawyer or law firm or, in the absence of a bona fide office, the city or
town of the lawyer's primary registration statement address, in
accordance with subdivision (a)(2) of Rule 7.2; and
(3) are considered to be information provided upon request and,
therefore, are otherwise governed by the requirements of Rule 7.9.
(c) Electronic Mail Communications. A lawyer shall not send, or
knowingly permit to be sent, on the lawyer's behalf or on behalf of the
lawyer's firm or partner, an associate, or any other lawyer affiliated
with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, an unsolicited electronic mail
communication directly or indirectly to a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining professional employment unless:
(1) the requirements of subdivisions (b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B)(i),
(b)(2)(C), (b)(2)(D), (b)(2)(E) and (b)(2)(F) of Rule 7.4 are met;
(2) the communication discloses one or more bona fide office
location(s) of the lawyer or lawyers who will actually perform the
services advertised or, in the absence of a bona fide office, the city or
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defines computer-accessed communicationsll 9 and sets parameters
for the applicability of other rules contained in the same section to
such communications, with specific regard to law firm websites1 20
and email communications.
Subdivision (a) defines computer-accessed communications,
broadly encompassing any information regarding legal services
disseminated via computer. 122 It explicitly includes homepages,
websites, unsolicited email, and information appearing on search
engines but does not limit its application to these specific
communications.123 The seemingly limitless scope of this
definition includes information about legal services found
"elsewhere" on the Internet.124
Subdivision (b), entitled "Internet Presence," governs
homepages and websites that are controlled, sponsored, or
authorized by a lawyer or law firm and that contain legal service
information. 2 It requires jurisdiction and office location
disclosure and classifies law firm websites as "information
provided upon request," subjecting them to the requirements of
Rule 7.9.12 Rule 7.9 in turn subjects law firm websites to Rule
7.2,127 Louisiana's general attorney advertising rule but further
allows "factually verifiable statements concerning past results" that
are not "false, misleading or deceptive." 12 8 Thus, law firm
homepages and websites are governed by all substantive
advertising rules under Rule 7.2, with an additional jurisdiction
disclosure requirement and the expanded permissibility of nondeceptive testimonials.

town of the lawyer's primary registration statement address, in
accordance with subdivision (a)(2) of Rule 7.2; and
(3) the subject line of the communication states "LEGAL
ADVERTISEMENT."
Id.
118.

LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.

119. Id. R. 7.6(a).
120. Id. R. 7.6(b).
121. Id. R. 7.6(c).
122. Id. R. 7.6(a).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. R. 7.6(b).
126. Id.; see id. R. 7.9 ("Information About a Lawyer's Services Provided
upon Request").
127. Louisiana Rule 7.2, "Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services,"
describes required, permissible, and prohibited content of lawyer advertisements
and contains disclosure requirements. Id. R. 7.2; see infra note 132.
128. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.9(b)(3).
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Before its suspended enforcement resulting from the decision
in Public Citizen, Inc. v. LouisianaAttorney DisciplinaryBoard,l29
subdivision (d) effectively acted as a catch-all provision for
advertisements other than those contained on law firm websites or
Rule 7.6(d) applied to "[a]ll [other]
transmitted via email.'
computer-accessed communications concerning a lawyer's or law
firm's services"' 3 1 and subjected all such communications to the
requirements of Rule 7.2-the rule developed for traditional
advertisements.1 32 Louisiana Rule 7.6(d) stated:
(d) Advertisements. All computer-accessed communications
concerning a lawyer's or law firm's services, other than
those subject to subdivisions (b) [websites] and (c) [email] of
this Rule, are subject to the requirements of Rule 7.2133
when a significant motive for the law firm's doing so is the
law firm's pecuniary gain.' 3 4
c. The Changefrom Public Citizen: Suspending the Rule 7.6(d)
Catch-All Provision
In the fall of 2008, the plaintiffs in Public Citizen filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and
sought preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the

129. 642 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D. La. 2009).
130. Pursuant to the decision in Public Citizen, the Louisiana Supreme Court
issued an order suspending the enforcement of subdivision (d) on September 22,
2009. Supreme Court of La., Order (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.
Isba.org/2007MemberServices/AdvertO6O9/ROPCARTICLEXVIREVISEDS
EPT222009.pdf.
131. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.6(d). Subdivisions (b) and (c) of
Rule 7.6 relate to lawyer or law firm websites and unsolicited emails,
respectively. Thus, Rule 7.6(d) governs all computer-based communications
concerning legal services not falling within those categories.
132. Disclosure and disclaimer requirements of Louisiana Rule 7.2, to which
Louisiana Rule 7.6(d) subjected Internet advertisements, include Louisiana Rule
7.2(a)(1) (requiring the inclusion of the name of at least one lawyer responsible for
the content of the advertisement); Louisiana Rule 7.2(a)(2) (requiring disclosure of
the location of practice); Louisiana Rule 7.2(c)(1)(H) (requiring disclosure of
payment for paid testimonials or endorsements); Louisiana Rule 7.2(c)(1)(I)
(requiring disclaimer of portrayal of a client by a non-client or of depiction of any
events or pictures that are not actual or authentic); Louisiana Rule 7.2(c)(6)
(requiring disclosure of any costs in addition to advertised fee); Louisiana Rule
7.2(c)(9) (requiring disclosure in every language that is used in the advertisement);
and Louisiana Rule 7.2(c)(10) (requiring disclosures be in a print size at least as
large as the largest print size used in the advertisement). Id. R. 7.2.
133. Id.
134. Id. R. 7.6(d).

2011]

COMMEfNT

769
S135

Louisiana proposed rules set to be effective December 1, 2008. In
response, the Louisiana Supreme Court postponed the effective date
of the proposed rules on three separate occasions. 136 During this
postponement, the LSBA conducted a survey on the perception of
lawyers and lawyer advertising, reviewed the proposed rules in light
of constitutional challenges, and submitted final recommendations
to the Louisiana Supreme Court.137
Among the several challenges to the proposed rules brought by
the plaintiffs in Public Citizen was a challenge to Rule 7.6(d), the
catch-all provision.' 3 8 Specifically, the plaintiffs contested the
application of the disclosure requirements of Rule 7.2139 to Internet
advertisements as mandated by Rule 7.6(d). 140 They focused their
argument on the incompatibility of these requirements to PPC
advertisements,14 ' asserting that Louisiana failed to produce
evidence that the catch-all Rule 7.6(d) directly advanced the state's
interest and that the rule was not narrowly tailored, and was
therefore unconstitutional.142 The court agreed, striking down Rule
7.6(d) because it was "not shown that [Louisiana] studied online
advertising techniques or methods and then attempted to formulate
a Rule that directly advanced the State's interests and was
narrowly tailored with respect to Internet advertising." 43
"Instead," the court continued, "[Louisiana], through its high court,
simply applied the same Rules as those developed for television,
radio, and print ads to Internet advertising." 1 "
Thus, in implementing the catch-all Internet rule, Louisiana did
not adequately consider the inherently different nature of Internet
advertising techniques as compared to traditional advertising in
light of applicable constitutional standards. Although the court
clearly held Rule 7.6(d) unconstitutional because it neither
"directly and materially advance[d] the State's interest [n]or [was
it] narrowly tailored,"145 the court nevertheless left the door open
for further implementation of Internet advertising regulation in the
decision's final footnote:
135. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 642 F. Supp. 2d 539,
544 (E.D. La. 2009).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 544-45.
138. Id. at 546.
139. See supra note 132 (listing disclosure and disclaimer requirements of
Louisiana Rule 7.2).
140. Pub. Citizen, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
141. See discussion supra Part IL.B.1.
142. Pub. Citizen, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 558-59.
143. Id. at 559.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 559-60.
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The Court expresses no opinion regarding the First
Amendment integrity of the proposed Internet Rules. If the
Louisiana Supreme Court wishes to pursue an appropriate
administrative process regarding regulation of Internet
advertising and then return to an examination of law firm
advertising on the Internet, the high court has the authority
to do so, consistent with this Court's opinion.146
The court noted that "Internet advertising differs significantly
from advertising in traditional media,"1 47 concluding that "the
Internet presents unique issues related to advertisin , which the
State failed to consider in formulating [Rule 7.6(d)].' 48 Thus, the
notable change in Louisiana Rule 7.6 after the Public Citizen
decision was the suspended enforcement of the catch-all Rule
7.6(d).1 49 All other portions of the rule remain in effect.
2. Florida'sApproach to Internet Advertising Regulation:Rule
4-7.6 "Computer-Accessed Communications"
The similarities between Louisiana Rule 7.6 and Florida Rule
4-7.6 present many of the same challenges regarding regulation of
attorney Internet advertising. A comparative analysis of the two
rules and their treatment of Internet advertising sheds light on
problems with catch-all subjection of Internet advertisements to
traditional advertising rules as well as problems arising from the
absence of a catch-all provision,' 5 0 and it reveals possible solutions
for states attempting to incorporate Internet advertising
regulations.' 5
a. FloridaRule 4-7.6
The Florida Supreme Court adopted Florida Rule 4-7.6152 in
1999 to address computer-accessed communications.' 5 3 In doing
146. Idat560n.16.
147. Id. at 559.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 130 (regarding the Louisiana Supreme Court order
suspending enforcement of Louisiana Rule 7.6(d)).
150. See discussion infra Part IV.
151. See discussion infra Part V.
152. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-7.6 (2010). The comment reads
as follows:
Advances in telecommunications and computer technology allow
lawyers to communicate with other lawyers, clients, prospective clients,
and others in increasingly quicker and more efficient ways. Regardless of
the particular technology used, however, a lawyer's communications
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so, Florida became one of the first states to adopt a rule
of computer-accessed
addressing regulation
specifically
communications and the Internet.154
Although there is not a notable contextual difference between
Florida Rule 4-7.6 and Louisiana Rule 7.6, there is a substantive
difference between their classifications of law firm websites as
"information provided upon request." 55 Louisiana has a rule
specifically addressing information provided upon request, which
subjects such information to the general rules governing
advertising.156 Florida, alternatively, does not subject information
upon request to its advertising rules.' 5 7 Thus, in Louisiana, law
with prospective clients for the purpose of obtaining professional
employment must meet standards designed to protect the public from
false, deceptive, misleading, or confusing messages about lawyers or the
legal system and to encourage the free flow of useful legal-related
information to the public.
The specific regulations that govern computer-accessed communications
differ according to the particular variety of communication employed.
For example, a lawyer's Internet web site is accessed by the viewer upon
the viewer's initiative and, accordingly, the standards governing such
communications correspond to the rules applicable to information
provided to a prospective client at the prospective client's request.
In contrast, unsolicited electronic mail messages from lawyers to
prospective clients are functionally comparable to direct mail
communications and thus are governed by similar rules. Additionally,
communications advertising or promoting a lawyer's services that are
posted on search engine screens or elsewhere by the lawyer, or at the
lawyer's behest, with the hope that they will be seen by prospective
clients are simply a form of lawyer advertising and are treated as such by
the rules.
This rule is not triggered merely because someone other than the lawyer
gratuitously links to, or comments on, a lawyer's Internet web site.
Id. cmt.
153. See Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar-Advertising Rules,
762 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1999).
154. Prior to the adoption of Florida Rule 4-7.6, the Florida Rules subjected
websites to the general advertising rules.
155. Both rules treat websites as "information provided upon request." The
Louisiana Rules subject "information provided upon request" to Louisiana Rule
7.2, which governs all advertisements. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.9
(2010). However, the Florida Rules do not subject "information provided upon
request" to its advertising rules. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-7.1(f)
("Subchapter 4-7 shall not apply to communications between a lawyer and a
prospective client if made at the request of that prospective client.").
156. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.9.
157. In 2006, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the recommendations of the
Advertising Task Force 2004 and deleted Florida Rule 4-7.9 regarding
information at the request of a prospective client. In doing so, the court also
adopted Florida Rule 4-7.1(f), which provides that information provided upon
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firm websites are subject to the general requirements of all
advertisements under Louisiana Rule 7.2, but in Florida, such
websites are subject to no regulation under Florida subchapter 4-7,
except for a general prohibition against dishonesty.15 8
Another important difference is that although Louisiana's Rule
7.6(d) catch-all provision was suspended,159 Florida's Rule 4-7.6(d)
catch-all provision remains in effect.' 60 Thus, unlike in Louisiana,
all Internet advertisements in Florida, other than law firm websites
and email communications, are subject to the general rules
governing traditional advertisements under Florida Rule 4-7.2.
b. Amendments, Proposedand Failed
On February 26, 2008, the Florida Bar submitted to the Florida
Supreme Court a petition to amend the Florida Rules, specifically
"Computer-Accessed
entitled
4-7.6,
Rule
addressing
Communications." 61 The proposed amendments, 2 which were

request is not subject to the lawyer advertising rules. Florida Rule 4-7.1(g), also
adopted at this time, provides that all lawyer communications remain subject to
the general prohibition against conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
158. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-7.1(g) (providing that all lawyer
communications remain subject to the general prohibition against conduct
involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation).
159. See supra note 130 (regarding the Louisiana Supreme Court order
suspending enforcement of Louisiana Rule 7.6(d)).
160. Florida Rule 4-7.6(d) states: "(d) Advertisements. All computer-accessed
communications concerning a lawyer's or law firm's services, other than those
subject to subdivisions (b) [websites] and (c) [email] of this rule, are subject to the
requirements of rule 4-7.2." RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-7.6(d).
161. See PETITION TO AMEND THE RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BARRULE 4-7.6, COMPUTER ACCESSED COMMUNICATIONS (2008) [hereinafter FINAL
PETITION], available at http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/
Attachments/F989C9A575EA581285257460006E8B82/$FJLE/Final%20Petition
Florida
%20-%2OAmendments%20to%20RRTFB%204-7.6.pdf?OpenElement.
Bar President Kelly Overstreet Johnson appointed the Advertising Task Force
2004 (the "Task Force") on February 9, 2004, the findings of which were
previously provided to the Florida Supreme Court in a petition filed in the case In
re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the FloridaBar-Advertising,971 So. 2d
763 (Fla. 2007). The court declined to adopt changes to Rule 4-7.6 at that time,
pending a study of regulation of websites by the Special Committee on Website
Advertising Rules (the "Special Committee"), stating that "it is not efficient or
sound for the Court to address the regulation of Internet advertising at this time,
while the special committee is studying these very issues." Id. at 764. As a result,
the proposed amendments contained in the February 2008 petition include changes
to Rule 4-7.6 that had been previously developed by the Task Force, as well as
changes regarding regulation of websites found under Rule 4-7.6(b) that were
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considered by the Florida Supreme Court in In re Amendments to
the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Rule 4-7.6, Computer
Accessed Communications,16 3 "address[ed] changes in terminology
and technology, [took] into account the methods the public uses to
access computer advertising, recognize[d] the vast flow of
information through the Internet, and [sought] to provide a new
attorney
computer-accessed
approach
to
regulating
advertisements."' 6 4
The proposed changes to subdivision (b), governing law firm
websites, separated websites into two categories, homepages and
the remainder of the website, and applied different rules to each
classification.165 Under the proposed changes, law firm homepages
and websites would be subject to all substantive attorney
advertising rules except the filing requirement.166 However, the
remainder of a website beyond the homepage would be exempt
from the prohibition against statements characterizing the quality
of legal services, the prohibition against providing information on
past results, and the prohibition against testimonials if appropriate
disclaimers were present.' 6 7

developed by the Special Committee and the Florida Bar. See PETITION TO AMEND
THE RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR-RULE 4-7.6, COMPUTER ACCESSED
COMMUNICATIONS, APPENDIX D (2008), available at http://www.floridabar.org/
TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/6205CO953211 1B7852574630055CFF7/$
FILE/Appendix%20D%20-%2OFinal%20Report.pdfOpenElement.
162. See PETITION TO AMEND THE RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BARRULE 4-7.6, COMPUTER ACCESSED COMMUNICATIONS, APPENDIX B (2008),
available at http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/
AF807F9E 111 A96468525746300557797/$FILE/Appendix%20B%20-%2OFull%
see also
20TextO/o2Oof%/2Proposed%2Rule%20Changes.pdfOpenElement;
PETITION TO AMEND THE RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR-RULE 4-7.6,
COMPUTER ACCESSED COMMUNICATIONS, APPENDIX C (2008) [hereinafter
APPENDIX C], available at http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/
Attachments/F14041D875FD58E985257463005590EA/$FILE/Appendix%20C%
20-%202%2OColumn%2OFormat.pdfOpenElement.
163. 24 So. 3d 172 (Fla. 2009). The proposed amendments contained
changes to all subdivisions of Florida Rule 7.6. With regard to subdivision (d),
the catch-all provision covering all Internet advertisements other than law firm
websites and emails, the changes would have restricted the subdivision's
applicability to unsolicited computer-accessed communications and modified
language for clarity. See APPENDIX C, supra note 162, at 5; see also FINAL
PETITION, supranote 161, at 9.

164.

In re Amendments, 24 So. 3d at 172.

165.

See APPENDIX C, supra note 162, at 1-4; see also FINAL PETITION,

supranote 161, at 2-8.
166. Lawyer advertisements must be filed for review under Florida Rule 4-7.7.
167.

See APPENDIX C, supra note 162, at 1-4.
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These amendments to subdivision (b) attempted to strike a
middle ground between subjecting law firm websites to all
substantive advertising rules and leaving them virtually
unregulated as information upon request. However, they did not
substantively address the overly broad catch-all provision, nor did
they account for the fact that law firm websites are often visited as
a result of clicking an advertisement that falls under the catch-all
provision. The Florida Supreme Court struck down the proposed
amendments because they did not address material beyond the
homepae sufficiently for it to be categorized as information upon
request. 8 In other words, the court wanted more safeguards to
ensure that material found on a law firm website, i.e., beyond the
homepage, would not be misleading. The court added that certain
steps could be taken to make information beyond a homepage
constitute information upon request, such as the completion of an
online request form and the acceptance of a disclaimer-an
Internet measure comparable to that of requesting physical
information such as a brochure.169 Thus, the Florida Supreme
Court found that the proposed increase in website regulation was
not adequate to protect consumers, and in doing so sent the Florida
Bar back to the drawing board.

IV.

PROBLEMS ARISING FROM BOTH THE PRESENCE AND ABSENCE
OF A CATCH-ALL PROVISION THAT SUBJECTS INTERNET
ADVERTISEMENTS TO THE RULES GOVERNING TRADITIONAL
ADVERTISEMENTS

Former Louisiana Rule 7.6(d) and current Florida Rule 4-7.6(d)
attempt to categorically regulate Internet advertisements in one fell
swoop by employing a catch-all provision that subjects those
advertisements to the rules governing traditional forms of
advertising.o7 0 Adopting rules that fail to account for the presence
of various advertising media within the Internet and that subject
such media to the content requirements governing traditional
media raises constitutional and practical problems. These problems
suggest that states like Louisiana and Florida should eliminate such
an overly broad catch-all provision. However, eliminating the
catch-all provision raises more issues with regard to how potential
clients encounter law firm websites through advertising, which

168. In re Amendments, 24 So. 3d at 173.
169. Id. at 173-74.
170. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-7.6(d) (2010); LA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.6(d) (2010); supra Part III.B. Lb; supra note 160.
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should be considered when generating a solution for the absence of
a catch-all provisions.
A. Cut the Catch-All: ProblemsArisingfrom the Presence of the
Catch-All Provision
The catch-all Internet provisions employed by Louisiana and
Florida subject all computer-based communications regarding legal
services, other than those contained on law firm websites or
transmitted via email, to the content requirements of traditional
advertisements. Their overly broad and insufficient language creates
constitutional concerns and practical inconsistencies that support the
proposition that these states should cut the catch-all provision.
1. ConstitutionalConsiderationsPresentedby the Catch-All
Provision
The court in Public Citizen recognized the constitutional
deficiencies arising from Louisiana's application of the principles
underlying Rule 7.2 to Internet communications through allencompassing language.17' There, the court applied the Central
Hudson test, which held that states could regulate attorney
advertisements (1) if the government asserted a substantial interest
in such regulation, (2) if the government demonstrated that the
restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advanced
that interest, and (3) if the regulation was narrowly drawn.172 As the
court in Public Citizen pointed out, Louisiana neither studied online
advertising technology nor formulated a rule "that directly advanced
the State's interest and was narrowly tailored with respect to Internet
advertising."' 7 3 Accordingly, the broad language of the catch-all
provision failed to meet applicable constitutional standards set forth
by Central Hudson and was properly held unconstitutional in
Louisiana.17174
2. PracticalConsiderationsPresentedby the Catch-All
Provision
Not only was the language of Louisiana's catch-all provision
unconstitutional, but its application of the content requirements of
171. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 642 F. Supp. 2d 539,
558 (E.D. La. 2009).
172. Id. (citing Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 559.
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Rule 7.2'17 to all Internet advertisements proved incompatible with
the finctionality of these advertisements. Although the court in
Public Citizen did not provide an in-depth analysis for any practical
inconsistencies arising from the catch-all provision,176 the plaintiffs
correctly argued that Rule 7.6(d) was incompatible with one of the
most prevalent forms of Internet advertising: PPC advertising.177
Problems arise specifically from the character limitations
imposed by and essential to PPC advertising campaigns and other
Internet advertisements which, in the case of AdWords, are 25 to
35 characters per line.' For instance, the name and office location
disclosure requirement 7 9 is inherently at odds with PPC
advertising. Because AdWords limits the number of characters for
each advertisement, the inclusion of a lawyer's name and office
location would likely leave little space for any substantive
advertising. Likewise, the requirement that paid testimonials or
endorsements disclose the fact of paymenti presents the same
problem. Furthermore, when such a disclaimer or disclosure is
required, Louisiana Rule 7.2(c)(10) requires that it be in "a print
size at least as large as the largest print size used in the
advertisements."' 1 Because PPC advertisements contain title lines
that are usually of a larger font than the subsequent text,182 the
application of this rule severely limits lawyers' use of the medium.
Thus, the disclosure requirements to which these advertisements
are subject under catch-all regulation effectively prohibit lawyers
from substantively advertising though a PPC medium.
Additionally, the requirement of Rule 7.7 that advertisements
be submitted for review is at odds with the inherently changing
nature of PPC advertising content.
With respect to AdWords,
several variations of PPC advertisements are produced by Google
to determine which advertisement is the most effective.' 84 The
continual refining of the language of each advertisement is
essential to the advertisement's effectiveness185 Thus, submitting
for review every advertisement variation, along with its
175. See supra note 132 (listing disclosure and disclaimer requirements of
Louisiana Rule 7.2).
176. Pub. Citizen, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 559.
177. Id.
178. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
179. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(a)(1)-(2) (2010).
180. Id. R. 7.2(c)(1)(H).
181. Id. R. 7.2(c)(10).
182. See discussion supraPart II.B. 1.
183. See LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.7.
184. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
185. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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corresponding filing fee,1 86 is overly burdensome and negates the
beneficial nature of advertising through the self-serving
Ultimately, the cost-effective nature of AdWords is
medium.
counteracted by the imposition of this filing fee for every
advertisement. 1" This impracticality was recognized by the court
in Public Citizen in its decision to hold Rule 7.7 unconstitutional as
it pertains to the filing requirement. 189
Perhaps more importantly, even though Louisiana did not
adequately consider current Internet advertising options, Louisiana
should be mindful that these advertisements will continue to
evolve at the pace of technology. Using technology to improve
quality and reduce the cost of providing legal services ensures that
Internet advertising will continue to evolve as a "powerful tool in
law" for the future of the profession.190 Lawyers' use of social
network-based technologies is increasing, and this trend is driven
primarily by cost savings and value enhancement. 191 These drivers
will continue to propel the evolution of this technology through the
development of new applications, ensuring that unique and
adaptive forms of technology will continue to be adopted by legal
practitioners. 192 Although consideration should be given to the
forms of Internet advertising that exist today, technological
advancement will continue to expand the regulatory gap where
catch-all regulation has proved inadequate on constitutional and
186. Louisiana Rule 7.7 sets out the filing requirements for attorney
advertisements. See Lawyer Advertising, LA. ST. BAR Ass'N, http://www.
Isba.org/2007MemberServices/lawyeradvertising.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2010)
(providing detailed information regarding the $175 filing fee).
187. SCHULTZ, supra note 39, at 3.
188. Id.
189. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 642 F. Supp. 2d 539,
559 (E.D. La. 2009).
190. See Paul Lippe, The Role of Social Networking in Law, AM. LAW. (July
30, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202432624155
&slretum= 1&hbxlogin=1 ("[S]ocial networking will prove to be a powerful tool
in law, because its structure reflects the distributed nature of the legal
profession, so it has the potential to help improve quality and reduce costs at a
time when these are more of a clients' priorities than ever before.").
191. See Paul Lippe, Welcome to the Future: Oh So Social?, AMLAW DAILY
9
(July 28, 2009, 5:45 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/200 /07/
future.html ("[T]he financial pressure on the legal industry will accelerate
adoption of these tools if they can help clients save money or lawyers generate
revenue .... ).
192. See Om Malik, Moore's Law Reconsidered,CNNMONEY (Apr. 3, 2007),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2 archive/2007/03/01/8401
037/index.htm (describing the collaboration of current technology applications
and mobile communication devices such as the iPhone as an example of a
today's continuation of Moore's Law regarding evolution of computing power).
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practical grounds. Thus, catch-all regulation of Internet
advertisements and their subjection to the rules governing
traditional advertisements will become more difficult as
technology advances and should accordingly be abandoned.
Louisiana's attempt to enact a rule that categorically governs
all Internet media and subjects such media to a rule developed for
traditional advertising results in deficiencies that were simply
overlooked. Louisiana Rule 7.6 addresses websites and emails with
adequate specificity for lawyers to understand prohibited conduct.
However, for all other Internet media, Rule 7.6(d) provides little
guidance for lawyers to advertise their services. As evidenced by
the Public Citizen holding, application of traditional advertising
regulations to all emerging Internet technologies will not only fail
in light of constitutional scrutiny but will inhibit the free flow of
information necessary for the legal profession to adequately serve
a client base that is increasingly knowledgeable of, if not
dependent on, the Internet.19 3 States should, therefore, follow
Louisiana's lead by abandoning catch-all regulation that fails to
consider the inherent distinctions that set Internet advertisements
apart from their traditional counterparts.
B. The Effect of Cutting the Catch-All: Problems Arisingfrom the
Absence of the Catch-All Provisionwith Respect to Differing
Treatment of Websites as "Informationupon Request"
The exemption of emerging forms of Internet advertising from
overly broad catch-all regulation is necessary on constitutional and
practical grounds. However, Louisiana's failed attempt to regulate
attorney Internet advertising leaves many Internet media largely
unregulated. Thus, the problem that Louisiana faces has shiftedinsufficient language contained in Rule 7.6(d)'s catch-all provision
has been replaced by a lack of governing language post-Public
Citizen, leaving consumers vulnerable to unregulated and
potentially misleading advertisements.
Without application of substantive advertising rules to Internet
advertisements, these advertisements would likely be subject only
to the general prohibitions contained in many state rules against

193. See Lucy Schlauch Leonard, Comment, The High-Tech Legal Practice:
Attorney-Client Communications and the Internet, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 851,
852 (1998) ("[A]s clients and the marketplace demand greater efficiency from
attorneys, those attorneys who fail to use the technology available to them will
find themselves less valuable to their clients.").
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false and misleading statements.' 94 These general prohibitions
likely do not provide adequate safeguards for consumers because,
as seen in traditional advertising regulation, even truthful
statements can be misleading when not accompanied by certain
disclosures-especially in technological contexts that provide
limited advertising space.
Because legal PPC advertisements redirect potential clients to
law firm websites, deregulating these advertisements may increase
the visitation of law firm websites that results from clicking a
potentially misleading advertisement. With emerging forms less
regulated, that which often prompts law firm website visitationan Internet advertisement-may be more misleading because of the
exemption of otherwise necessary information from disclosure.
From this perspective, one might accept the view that websites,
when their visitation is the result of an unregulated advertisement,
are a continuance of that advertisement. The question, then, is: at
what point does information cease to be an advertisement, which is
subject to all substantive advertising rules, and become
information upon request, which is subject to such rules depending
on a state's definition?
The answer to this question depends on which definition of
information upon request is employed-Louisiana's or Florida's.
Louisiana subjects information upon request to its advertising
rules,' 95 while Florida does not.' 96 As a result, Louisiana's
treatment of websites as information upon request demands a
higher standard than does Florida's treatment. Therefore, cutting
the catch-all provision would have a potentially more detrimental
impact in states like Florida because, under the Florida Rules, an
unregulated, potentially misleading advertisement that redirects a
potential client to a law firm website would at no point in that
process be subject to Florida's substantive advertising rules.
One seemingly appropriate solution for states like Florida
would be to simply increase website regulation. This view would
hold that Internet advertisement regulation is unnecessary because
increased website regulation would cure misleading notions
created by those advertisements. Subjecting websites to all
194. See, e.g., RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-7.1(g) (2010)
(providing that all lawyer communications remain subject to the general
prohibition against conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation).
195. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.9(a) (2010) ("Information provided
about a lawyer's or law firm's services upon request shall comply with the
requirements of Rule 7.2 unless otherwise provided in this Rule 7.9.").
196. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-7.1(f) ("Subchapter 4-7 shall
not apply to communications between a lawyer and a prospective client made at
the request of that prospective client.").
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substantive advertising rules and additionally requiring disclosures
and disclaimers not otherwise contained in the Internet
advertisement that prompted visitation would seem to accomplish
this. Thus, decreased regulation of Internet advertisements
arguably calls for a corresponding increase in website regulation,
which would serve to counteract any misleading notions created by
deregulating Internet advertisements.
The Florida Bar submitted a proposal that sought to increase
the regulation of homepages to the Florida Supreme Court in a
petition to amend the Florida Rules in 2008.197 The petition, which
was struck down by the court, contained an amendment that would
subject law firm homepages to all substantive attorney advertising
rules except the filing requirement.' 9 8 The amendment would then
have the remainder of the website, i.e., everyhing beyond the
homepage, treated as information upon request. 9
This proposed amendment was struck down because the
suggested measures were not sufficient to make material behind
the homepage fall under the definition of information upon
request.20 As the court noted, however, information beyond a
homepage could constitute information upon request if regulations
required additional safeguards, such as the completion of a request
form and the acceptance of a disclaimer.2 0 In other words,
material beyond a homepage could be classified as information
upon request, and thus exempt from the general advertising rules,
if an Internet user were required to provide his information when
requesting to view such material. Because the amendments were
struck down, the Florida Rules do not apply general advertising
rules to homepages and websites under their classification as
information upon request.
This regulatory focus on website regulation as a counteractive
measure is further supported by the idea that law firm homepages
often serve as a "home base" to which potential clients are
redirected after clicking an advertisement. Consequently, the
homepage may be the more appropriate place for disclaimers and
disclosures, rather than the advertisement itself, because it is where
the bulk of information regarding a lawyer's services can be found.
Nevertheless, homepages and websites are frequently
encountered voluntarily through specific searches for lawyers or law
197. See FINAL PETITION, supra note 161.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar-Rule 4-7.6,
Computer Accessed Commc'ns, 24 So. 3d 172, 173 (2009).
201. Id. at 173-74.
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firms or by entering a particular web address. Thus, increasing
homepage or website regulation might cure any misleading notions
created by unregulated advertisements but would subject them to
unnecessary regulation for those seeking to voluntarily encounter
the site. Increasing such regulation would thereby inhibit the free
flow of information desired by potential clients when choosing legal
services. This unnecessary regulation would then be at odds with the
requirement that regulations be narrowly tailored.20 2 Thus, other
measures should be considered that serve to both protect consumers
and allow for the free flow of information on the Internet.
V. A SOLUTION AT THE CROSSROADS OF INTERNET ADVERTISING
AND LAW FIRM WEBSITES: THE CLICKWRAP SOLUTION

Any solution that attempts to address attorney advertising on
the Internet must consider the interplay between emerging forms of
Internet advertising, such as PPC advertisements, and law firm
websites. Links contained in PPC advertisements redirect potential
clients to a law firm website.203 Thus, the content of an
advertisement can heavily influence whether that advertisement is
clicked and, in turn, whether a law firm website is viewed.
Accordingly, states should consider regulation of such advertising
and of law firm websites as related concerns.
If states assert a substantial interest in regulating Internet
advertisements, such regulation should directly advance that
interest by curing misleading notions arising from those
advertisements, but it should also be narrowly tailored to avoid the
practical problems arising from catch-all language as seen in the
Louisiana and Florida rules. An appropriate regulatory measure
that would fulfill these criteria is one that allows the viewer of an
Internet advertisement to assent to being redirected to a law firm
website after clicking that advertisement but before proceeding to
the website. In other words, effective regulation would require
disclosures and disclaimers neither in the advertisement itself nor
on the website, but at the crossroads of the two.
The clickwrap agreement would make this possible. A
clickwrap agreement is an Internet agreement that requires its user
to consent to terms or conditions by clicking a dialog box on the
screen in order to proceed.2 04 These agreements are mostly found
202. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
564-65 (1980).
203.

See Kushmerick, supra note 64.

204. Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 2002));
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on the Internet, as part of the installation process of software
packages, or in other circumstances where agreement is sought
using electronic media. 205 In order to assess a clickwrap
agreement's potential worth in the attorney Internet advertisement
process as a mechanism to further regulatory objectives, one can
consider the process by which a potential client encounters a
common attorney Internet advertisement. An Internet user who
searches for "Injury Attorney" on Google views several search
results, including a number of "sponsored links," which are
attorney PPC advertisements. These advertisements lure the user to
click them, thereby redirecting the user to a law firm website.
Catch-all regulation inhibits a lawyer-advertiser from displaying a
substantive, meaningful advertisement by the character limits
imposed by, though necessary to, PPC advertisements because
information disclosure is required in the advertisement itself.206
Without catch-all regulation, though, the advertisement may
contain misleading information prohibited in traditional
advertisements, so the source of the user's visit to the law firm
website could be tainted.2 07 However, with the clickwrap solution
in effect, a user who clicks one of these advertisements would
quickly view a dialog box, which contains any necessary
disclosures not contained in the advertisement before proceeding to
the law firm website. Thus, the clickwrap solution would protect
consumers from misleading advertisements while allowing lawyers
to freely advertise their services through Internet media such as
PPC advertisements.
Clickwrap agreements are foreign neither to courtrooms nor
legal commentary. Courts have addressed clickwrap agreements in
the context of enforceability. 208 Commentators have suggested that

see also James J. Tracey, Legal Update, Browsewrap Agreements: Register.com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 11 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 164, 165 (2005) (distinguishing
clickwrap agreements from "browsewrap agreements," which allow the user to
view the terms of the agreement but do not require the user to take any
affirmative action before the website performs its end of the contract).
205. Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593-94
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), af'd,306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
206. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
207. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
208. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
acceptance of an offer and the terms contained within the shrinkwrap license by
clicking through the dialog box); Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp.
2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding certain aspects of a clickwrap agreement
"unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable"); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513
F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (upholding forum-selection clause); i.Lan Sys.,
Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 336 (D. Mass. 2002)
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clickwrap agreements should be utilized by law firms as a
disclaimer to address confidentiality concerns when potential clients
visit a law firm website. 209 Furthermore, such agreements have been
promoted as a useful tool to define the scope of representation and
prevent unintended attomey-client relationships for attorneys
operating a web-based virtual law office. 2 10 As attorneys transition
to virtual law office practice, clickwrap agreements are likely to
become the standard for online legal contracting between attorney
and client. 2 11 Thus, the use of clickwrap agreements to provide
advertising disclosure would be a logical extension of its growing
functionality in the legal profession.
The clickwrap solution would serve to alleviate both the
problems arising from the presence of a catch-all provision as well
as problems arising from its absence due to limited definitions of
information upon request, such as that found in Florida.2 12 The use
of a clickwrap agreement in conjunction with otherwise
unregulated advertisements would serve to cure any misleading
notions before a user is redirected from an unregulated
advertisement to a law firm website. Thus, it would fulfill the
purpose of a catch-all provision, while correcting practical
inconsistencies. These practical problems would be alleviated
because, with the clickwrap solution in place of a catch-all
provision, the advertisement itself would not be subject to the
content requirements of traditional advertisements. Rather, the
means by which websites are accessed through advertisements
would be regulated. Consequently, the character limitations
(upholding a clickwrap agreement as contract formation); In re RealNetworks,
Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 00-C-1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000)
(upholding an arbitration clause).
209. David Hricik, Mercer Univ. Sch. of Law, Whoops! I Did It Again! What
Britney Spears Can Teach Us About the Ethical Issues Arising from the
Intentional Transmission of Confidences from Prospective Clients to Firms,
HRICIK.COM (May 2004), http://www.hricik.com/eethics/3.1.html.
210. STEPHANIE L. KIMBRO, PRACTICING LAW ONLINE: CREATING A WEBBASED VIRTuAL LAW OFFICE 13 (rev. ed. 2009), available at http://www.
vlotech.com/ebooks/PracticingLawOnline.pdf. A virtual law office (VLO) is a
professional law practice that exists online through a secure portal and is
accessible to the client and the attorney anywhere the parties may access the
Internet. A VLO provides attorneys and clients with the ability to securely
discuss matters online, download and upload documents for review, and handle
other business transactions in a secure digital environment. Id. at 4.
211. Id. at 14. The ABA Committee on Cyberspace Law provides sources to
assist attorneys in researching and drafting VLO online agreements. See
Business Law Section: Committee on Cyberspace Law, A.B.A., http://www.
abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL320000 (last modified Dec. 6, 2010).
212. See discussion supra Part IV.
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imposed by PPC advertisements would no longer inhibit lawyers
from benefiting from the efficient and cost effective manner of
such advertisements because any disclosure requirements not
contained in the advertisements could be fulfilled by way of the
clickwrap. Although this solution would require an intermediate
step that Internet users could simply bypass by clicking "continue"
or "agree," disclosure by clickwrap is arguably more effective than
traditional disclosure in the advertisement itself, as it provides
disclosure in an independent setting that draws focus to its content.
Furthermore, a clickwrap solution is more appropriate than
increasing website regulation because the latter inhibits voluntary
website visitation by failing to distinguish voluntary visitors from
those redirected by advertising. If disclosures not contained in
advertisements were required to be displayed on the homepage, a
voluntary website visitor would be presented with unnecessary
information
disclosure.
Alternatively, utilizing clickwrap
agreements in conjunction with Internet advertisements would allow
users to bypass such agreements when searching for a specific
lawyer or law firm or entering a law firm's web address. As such,
the clickwrap solution would allow homepages and websites in
states like Florida to remain categorized as information upon
request, while alleviating otherwise tainted website visitation. Thus,
the free flow of information on the Internet could then be preserved
for those who are searching for specific lawyers or law firms.
Accordingly, rather than catch-all regulation of the content and
medium of attorney Internet advertisements, subjection of
otherwise non-conforming advertisements to the requirement of a
clickwrap agreement before website visitation is a proper solution.
Redrafting the language of Louisiana Rule 7.6(d) would
appropriately incorporate this measure:
(d) All computer-accessed communications concerning a
lawyer's or law firm's services, other than those subject to
subdivisions (b) and (c) of this Rule, the purpose of which
is to redirect a user to an Internet Presence as described in
subdivision (b), 213 shall first redirect the user to a page on
which assent can be given to, and which contains, all
statements, disclosures, and disclaimers as required by Rule
7.2 not otherwise contained in such communication.

213. An Internet Presence is broadly defined as "[a]ll World Wide Web sites
and home pages accessed via the Internet that are controlled, sponsored, or
authorized by a lawyer or law firm and that contain information concerning the
lawyer's or law firm's services." LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.6(b) (2010).
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The scope of this language would encompass any Internet
advertisement that redirects a user who clicks it to a website
sponsored, authorized, or controlled by a lawyer or law firm.214
This includes all PPC advertisements, such as those found on
search engines, social networking sites, and banner-type
advertisements. As most Internet advertisements entice users to
"click through" them and redirect users to a website, the clickwrap
solution would bring regulation up to speed with current lawyer
use of advertising technology.
The clickwrap solution, although broad in application, is
sufficiently narrower in both a constitutional and technical sense
than former Louisiana Rule 7.6(d), which was overly broad in both
language and principle. Rather than subjecting Internet
advertisements to traditional content regulation, as Louisiana's
catch-all provision attempted, states should incorporate a means
regulation that is considerate of the practical problems arising from
both the existence of the catch-all provision and its absence. The
language of the failed Louisiana catch-all provision sought to
regulate the content of Internet advertisements and would have
required inclusion of disclosures and disclaimers in the
advertisement itself. Alternatively, by providing lawyeradvertisers the option to display necessary disclosure either in the
advertisement itself or by way of a clickwrap agreement, the
clickwrap solution alleviates the constitutional and practical
shortfalls of the former rule.
The Florida Supreme Court noted that the purpose of Rule 47.6 is to "protect consumers from misleading information, provide
consumers with accurate and helpful information in the selection
of a lawyer, and respect lawyers' abilities to provide information
about themselves to the .public." 215 The clickwrap solution, as it
modifies former Louisiana Rule 7.6(d), fulfills each of these
purposes in a manner mindful of consumer protection, commercial
speech implications, and current advertising technologies.
CONCLUSION

Emerging Internet advertising technologies have complicated
an ongoing war between state bar associations attempting to
regulate legal advertisements and lawyers seeking to market their
services. As illustrated by Louisiana's failed attempt to regulate
attorney Internet advertising, inequities resulting from states'
214. Id.
215. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar-Rule 4-7.6,
Computer Accessed Commc'ns, 24 So. 3d 172, 173 (Fla. 2009).
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failure to recognize the dynamic nature of these technologies have
manifested themselves through careless rule adoption, thereby
empowering lawyers and public interest organizations with valid
claims to attack unwarranted regulation.
Categorical regulation of Internet advertisements and their
subjection to traditional advertising rules fails to acknowledge the
distinction between traditional and emerging forms of advertising,
such as pay-per-click advertisements. Requiring traditional
disclosure in Internet advertisements severely limits lawyers' use of
such media due to the strict character limitations contained therein.
Thus, application of traditional rules to these technologies fails to
consider their functionality and results in constitutional and practical
discord. If states assert a substantial interest in regulating attorney
Internet advertisements, they should recognize the constitutional and
practical problems arising from overly broad catch-all provisions
and should accordingly abandon uncompromising application of old
rules to new technologies.
Instead, as lawyers and clients continue to embrace such
technological advancements, states should likewise embrace such
technologies in the development of regulatory schemes by
incorporating tools such as the clickwrap agreement to accomplish
their regulatory end. The use of clickwrap agreements for
information disclosure at the junction of Internet advertisements
and law firm websites would allow lawyers to freely advertise their
services while protecting consumers from misleading notions
arising from otherwise unregulated advertisements.
An enduring war waged over World Wide Web advertising
regulation is fundamental to ensuring that the voice of both
perspectives is properly heard. However, if states continue to
disregard the underlying functionality and beneficial nature of
Internet advertising technologies, they will only stifle the free flow
of information presented thereby and replenish the arsenal of
lawyers' claims against them. As a result, states will then be forced
to reflect on that which Louisiana regrettably contemplates-what
went wrong on the World Wide Web.
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